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INTRODUCTION

Batson v. Kentucky was a landmark decision imposing constitutional
restrictions on peremptory challenges in the petit jury selection process.
Batson was a culmination of a long line of cases addressing racial
discrimination in jury selection. However, the role of anti-discrimination
doctrine in grand jury selection is often overlooked when the story of Batson
is considered. Many of the key equal protection cases underpinning the
Batson decision were grand jury cases. Furthermore, the evidentiary
framework applied to challenges to race-based peremptory strikes in Batson
was forged in a century's worth of grand jury discrimination doctrine. This
Essay, prepared for the "Batson at Twenty-Five: Perspectives on the
Landmark, Reflections on Its Legacy" Symposium at the University of Iowa
College of Law, highlights this significantjurisprudence-Batson's grand jury
DNA-and explores the import of its legacy.
Part I of this Essay sets the stage with the story of one defendant's
extraordinary 1933 challenge-orchestrated by his brilliant lawyer, Charles
Hamilton Houston-to the exclusion of blacks from the Loudoun County,
Virginia grand jury that indicted him for murder. This Part suggests that,
despite the Significantly different contextual backdrop of the nonadversarial
grand jury process (most notably, the absence of peremptory challenges in
grand jury selection), there is sufficient reason to investigate the grand jury's
role in the story of Batson. Part II chronicles how many of the significant
equal protection gains in the jury selection arena were won and solidified in
the context of challenges to discrimination in the selection of grand jurors.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence in grand jury
discrimination cases would lay the foundation for Batson. Part III explains
how Batson's articulation of the quantum of proof necessary for
demonstrating a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in the exercise of a
peremptory challenge can be attributed to the grand jury discrimination
cases of the previous century. This Essay concludes by contemplating
whether the lessons we have drawn from the quarter-century experience
under Batson might have some relevance for how we select and utilize grand
juries in contemporary criminal justice.
I.
A.

THE GRANDJURY'S RELEVANCE TO BATSON

CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE CRAwFoRD CASE

In 1932, Agnes Boeing Ilsley, a white socialite, and Nina Buckner, her
housekeeper, were murdered at the Ilsley home in Loudoun County,
Virginia.' A black man named George Crawford, a former Ilsley household

1. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATIONAND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 147 (2004).
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employee, emerged as the prime suspect,2 although evidence connected
Ilsley's own brother to the murder.3 In early 1933, Crawford was arrested in
Boston, Massachusetts on an unrelated charge and, after lengthy
interrogation by Boston and Virginia authorities, confessed to having
participated in the 1932 burglary of Ilsley's home along with another man
who Crawford claimed was solely responsible for the killing of the two
women.4 Crawford later recanted his participation in the burglary and
maintained his innocence.5 The Commonwealth of Virginia sought
extradition of Crawford from Massachusetts to Loudoun County to answer
an indictment for capital murder. 6
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
("NAACP") plunged into the case, which, like the early stages of the
Scottsboro Boys case,7 became a high-profile example of the legal work the
organization became known for in the first half of the twentieth century.' At
the helm of the NAACP's efforts in the Crawford case was the brilliant lawyer
Charles Hamilton Houston, the transformative "dean" of Howard University
School of Law ("HUSL"), who frequently collaborated with the NAACP even
before taking a formal "special counsel" role with the group in 1935.9

2.
See id.; PATRICIA SULLIVAN, LIFT EVERY VOICE: THE NAACP AND THE MAKING OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 164 (2009).

3.

See SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 164.

4.

SeeKLUGER, supra note I, at 14 8;SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 164-65.
See SULLIVAN, supra note 2,at 165.

5.
6.

See Hale v. Crawford, 65 F.2d 739, 740 0st Cir. 1933).

7.

See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969); JAMES
A. MILLER, REMEMBERING SCOTrSBORO: THE LEGACY OF AN INFAMOUS TRIAL (2009). But see

KLUGER, supra note I, at 144-46 (recounting difficulties faced by the NAACP in connection
with the Scottsboro case).
8.

See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS

FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION

(1994);

LONG IS THE WAY AND HARD, ONE

HUNDRED YEARS OF THE NAACP (Kevern Verney & Lee Sartain eds., 2009); MARK V. TUSHNET,
THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGYAGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).
9. See GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 121-27, 131-32 (1983). Houston did not carry the formal title of

"dean" at Howard despite performing the role. See id. at 79-8o. Along with his tremendous legal
skill, Houston's biography, credentials, and pedigree made him an attractive consultant for the
NAACP. Houston had excelled in the segregated District of Columbia public schools, graduated
Phi Beta Kappa from Amherst College, served as an officer in World War I, graduated at the top
of his class at Harvard Law School, and served as the first African American editor of the
HarvardLaw Review. See id.at 49-56; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Wielding the Double-Edged Sword: Charles
Hamilton Houston and JudicialActivism in the Age of Legal Realism, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 17
(1998); see alsoJost FELIPt ANDERSON, GENIUS FORJUSTICE: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND
THE REFORM OF AMERICAN LAW (forthcoming 2012). A prothg6 of Roscoe Pound and Felix
Frankfurter, Houston returned to Washington and became a partner in his father's law
practice. See Fairfax, supra, at 21. Houston later joined the faculty of Howard's law school,
helping to transform it into the premier training ground for African American lawyers in the
twentieth century. See ROBERT L. CARTER, A MATTER OF LAW: A MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE
CAUSE OF EQUAL RIGHTS 24-25 (2005); Fairfax, supra, at 2 1;Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil
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Houston and the NAACP team opposed the extradition of Crawford to
Virginia-seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts on the ground that blacks were excluded
from the Loudoun County, Virginia grand jury that had indicted him.- o
Though the argument against extradition-that Crawford "suffer[ed]
prejudice from the grand jury as constituted"' '-may have been novel, it was
well-supported by the evidence. Houston had traveled personally to
Loudoun County, Virginia in order to investigate the grounds for the
opposition to extradition. As Patricia Sullivan describes, Houston and his
team "interviewed several local officials, reviewed taxpayer lists from which
the grand jury list was drawn, examined the grand jury panel that indicted
Crawford, and secured sworn statements from local black citizens that no
blacks had served on juries in recent memory."' The team also
"documented the qualifications of white jurors who served, took depositions
from black citizens with equal or superior qualifications to white jurors, and
reviewed census data and tax lists."'3
All of the time and resources devoted to preparation for the argument
to Judge James A. Lowell of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts were no doubt viewed by the NAACP attorneys as a wise
investment. Success with such an extradition argument would open the door
to a new strategy of fighting jury discrimination in the South. As Sullivan
writes, " [i]n the future, when a black person faced indictment in the South
and he could make it North, a southern state would be unable to get him
back until it abandoned the practice of excluding blacks from juries."4
Houston himself believed that such a strategy "would go 'the greatest

Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005). Among Houston's
colleagues on the full-time faculty at HUSL was William E. Taylor, "who graduated at the top of
his class at Iowa University School of Law," SULLIVAN, supranote 2, at 161, and later served as
acting dean of HUSL and dean of the short-lived, Jim Crow-era Lincoln University School of
Law in Missouri. See KIMBERLEYJOHNSON, REFORMINGJIM CROW: SOUTHERN POLITICS AND STATE
IN THE AGE BEFORE BROWN 175 (2oo);J. CLAY SMITH,JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE

BLACK LAWYER: 1844-1944, at 62-63 (1993).
10.
See Crawford, 65 F.2d at 74o; DIANA KLEBANOW & FRANKLIN L. JONAS, PEOPLE'S
CRUSADERS FOR JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 219 (2003).

LAWYERS:

As was his frequent

practice, Houston recruited to his Crawford legal team some of his former Howard students,
including Thurgood Marshall, then a young attorney in Baltimore, Maryland. See SULLIVAN,
supra note 2, at 165-66. Houston and his former student Edward Lovett worked with two
Boston-based attorneys, J.Weston Allen, who had been Attorney General in Massachusetts, and
Butler R. Wilson, who headed the Boston branch of the NAACP. See Crawford, 65 F.2d at 740;
SULLIVAN,

supra note 2, at 165.

11.
SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 165 (quoting correspondence from Charles H. Houston)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
12.
Id.
13.

Id. at 166.

14.

Id.
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distance yet toward breaking up discrimination against Negroes on juries in
the South.'"'5
In April of 1933,Judge Lowell heard arguments from both the NAACP
and Loudoun County attorneys:
Virginia's representatives defended black exclusion from jury
service, citing it as 'just an old Virginia custom.' Crawford's lawyers
stated that Virginia could not have it both ways, namely invoking
the Constitution in demanding the prisoner's rendition while at
the same time violating the Constitution by illegally barring blacks
6
from serving on grand and petit juries.'
Judge Lowell granted the writ of habeas corpus but ordered Crawford held
pending appeal.'7 However, Crawford's victory was short-lived as the state
successfully appealed the grant of the writ to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit.' 8 The First Circuit, although sympathetic to the
NAACP's equal protection argument,'9 held that it was improper to
challenge a facially proper grand jury indictment through an application for
a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from a valid extradition order. ° The
court held that the proper route was to challenge the indictment in the state
trial court and, if necessary, seek review on direct appeal in state and federal
courts before seeking a writ of error in federal court.2 ' The United States
Supreme Court denied the NAACP's petition for certiorari, and Crawford
was extradited to Loudoun County, Virginia.22
During the subsequent state-court hearing on Crawford's motion to
dismiss the grand-jury indictment, Houston questioned the state circuit
judge "who had selected the grand jury that indicted Crawford."23 The judge

15.

Id. (quoting letters from Charles Hamilton Houston to Walter F. White (Mar. to,

1933) (Mar. 12, 1933) (Apr. 15, 1933)).
16. Id. at 167.
17. See Hale v. Crawford, 65 F.2d 739, 740-41 (ist Cir. 1933); SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at
167. As Professor Sullivan notes,Judge Lowell's decision was lauded as a landmark ruling in the
fight against jury discrimination and initiated calls by some southern members of Congress for
Lowell's impeachment. See RAwNJAMES,JR., ROOT AND BRANCH: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON,
THURGOOD MARSHALL, AND THE STRUGGLE TO END SEGREGATION 3-4 (201O); SULLIVAN, supra
note 2, at 167; see also KENNETH MACK, REPRESENTING A RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CML
RIGHTS LAWYER (forthcoming Sept. 2012) (on file with author).
18. See Crawford, 65 F.2d at 740.
19. See id. at 745. The court acknowledged Strauder v. West Virginia, 1oo U.S. 303 (1879),
and Exparte Virginia, 1oo U.S. 339, 346 (1879), and found "that the discrimination exercised by
the state officers of Virginia in making up the lists and drawings of the grand jurors by whom
Crawford was indicted, was an infringement of his rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Crawford, 65 F.2d at 745.
20.
See Crawford, 65 F.2d at 744.
21. See id. at 746-47.
22. See Crawford v. Hale, 290 U.S. 674 (1933); KLEBANOW &JONAS, supra note 1o, at 219.
23.

See KLUGER, supra note 1,at 150-51.
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reluctantly admitted that Loudoun County had a custom of having whiteonly grand juries because he did not know of any African Americans in the
county qualified for grand jury service-4 Houston then called to the stand
more than a dozen African American residents of Loudoun County, all of
whom testified as to their qualifications for grand jury service.5 Despite
Houston's skillful questioning and powerful summation, the court rejected
Crawford's motion. 6 After Houston's unsuccessful attempt to have the
Virginia trial court dismiss the indictment against Crawford on the grounds
of grand jury exclusion, Crawford was tried for and convicted of murder.7
For strategic reasons, Houston declined to appeal the grand-jury8
discrimination issue..
Although Houston was unsuccessful in pressing the grand-juryexclusion claim in Crawford, the episode effected change in Virginia as
"blacks began to appear on grand jury lists in several Virginia counties for
the first time in thirty years."29 Houston's strategy of challenging the
systematic exclusion of blacks from the grand jury highlighted an avenue
that defense lawyers had been utilizing in criminal cases since the
Reconstruction Era. Most importantly, however, such attacks on
discriminatory grand-jury selection practices would slowly shape the
Supreme Court's jury-selection-equal-protection jurisprudence and,
ultimately, would help to pave the way for Batson.
B. CoNTEXT MATTERS
Early in the Batson opinion, the United States Supreme Court declared
that "[t]he basic principles prohibiting exclusion of persons from
participation injury service on account of their race 'are essentially the same
for grand juries and for petit juries.'-30 But is this necessarily so? Of course,
broad equal protection principles apply in both contexts; the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the exclusion of blacks from grand juries and petit

24.

See id. at 1 51; see alsoJAMES, supra note 17, at 6-7.

i, at 151.
See id. at 151-52.
27.
See id. at 152-54; SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 184-85.
28. Crawford's initial story and alibi supporting his protestations of innocence began to
crumble under closer scrutiny leading up to trial. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 184. In the end,
Houston was forced to focus on persuading the jury to reject the death penalty, id. at 185, an
unlikely result in a case of a black defendant charged with the brutal murder of a wealthy white
woman in the 193os. For a fascinating treatment of the story of the Crawford murder trial, the
complex strategic choices made by Houston in convincing the jury to spare Crawford's life, and
the symbolic significance of an extraordinarily talented African American lawyer taking center
stage in a high-profile case in a Southern courtroom, see JAMES, supra note 17, at 1-15;
KLEBANOW & JONAS, supra note io, at 2 18-2o; KLUGER, supra note 1, at 147-54; MACK, supra
note 17; SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 184-86.
25.

See KLUGER, supra note

26.

29.

SULLvAN, supra note 2, at 184; see also KLUGER, supra note 1, at 53.

3o .

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 n.3 (1986).
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juries alike. However, do the distinct differences in context between grand
jury selection and petit jury selection make it inappropriate to consider the
grand jury when thinking about the principles underlying Batson?
After all, grand jury selection is a notoriously low-visibility exercise.
Many grand jury selection procedures involve only a court employee (such
as a clerk or jury commissioner) or a paneling judge.3' This lack of
transparency means that defense counsel often has little or no opportunity
to scrutinize how or why individuals are selected for service on a particular
grand jury panel.32 This differs greatly from petit jury selection, which takes
place on the record in open court and involves the participation of the
judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel. Furthermore, whereas the
institution of the petit jury is often celebrated as the crown jewel of our
constitutional democracy,33 the grand jury suffers from the reputation of
being "a weak, passive, and... unnecessary screening organ."34 Indeed, the
Supreme Court held in 1884 that a grand jury indictment was not a requisite
of due process in state criminal cases.35 Finally, and most profoundly, there
are no peremptory challenges in the context of grand jury selection. The
discriminatory exercise of the peremptory challenge-the issue at the very
heart of the Batson case-has no role in grand jury selection.
Nevertheless, there are important parallels between grand jury selection
and petit jury selection, aside from the shared susceptibility to equal
protection scrutiny. As grand jurors and petitjurors typically are drawn from
the same pool of potential jurors and the same jury box, discriminatory
actions often impact the composition of both bodies. Furthermore,
jurisdictions that intentionally excluded blacks from the grand jury typically
intentionally excluded blacks from the petit jury.36 Also, it is safe to say that
31.

See, e.g., Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878 (2oo6). In

some districts in the federal system, a representative of the United States Attorney sometimes
participates in grand jury selection and empanelment.
32.
See id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(b)(2); seealso U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL GRAND JURY
PRACTICE 4-7 (2000).

33.
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
34. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., GrandJury Discretion and ConstitutionalDesign, 93 CORNELL L. REv.
703, 705 (2008); see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Remaking the GrandJury, in GRAND JURY 2.0:
MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRANDJURY 323, 324-25 (Roger A. Fairfax, Jr. ed., 20 11) ("Why

retain the grand jury? Given the low esteem in which the grand jury is held in American legal
culture, it is surprising that we have not followed the lead of our English forbears and abolished
the whole enterprise. Complaints about the grand jury run the gamut from assertions that it
imposes unnecessary costs on the system, to the allegation that it is the complete captive of the
prosecution.").
35.
See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
36. However, some jurisdictions permitted a token number of blacks to serve on grand
juries (where unanimity is not required), even though they excluded blacks from petit juries
(where unanimity is typically, but not always, required). See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib,
Supermajoritarianismand the American CriminalJury, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 141, 142 (2006).

In fact, two blacks served on the grand jury that indicted the petitioner in Swain v. Alabama. See,
e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 38o U.S. 202, 205 (1965). This does not mean, however, that a lone
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certain procedural issues-including the limited statutory right of removal
of state criminal cases to federal court-contributed to the grand jury's
central role in the historical development of jury selection equal protection
jurisprudence.37
In the end, it is important to consider the role that challenges to
discriminatory grand jury selection played in the development of the
principles underpinning Batson. Indeed, the Supreme Court may have felt
the need to affirm that "[t]he basic principles prohibiting exclusion of
persons from participation in jury service on account of their race 'are
essentially the same for grand juries and for petit juries"'38 because it could
scarcely justify the holding in Batson without resting upon the equalprotection jurisprudence developed in the context of the grand-jury cases
stretching back over one hundred years. This Essay considers two aspects of
the Batson decision-the equal-protection foundation upon which the
opinion relies and its recalibration of the evidentiary burden necessary for
challenges to discriminatory peremptory strikes-and suggests that these
pillars upon which Batson rests were forged in the context of challenges to
the grand jury.
II.

GRANDJURY SELECTION EQUAL PROTECTIONJURISPRUDENCE ON THE ROAD
TO BATSON

Part Two of the Batson decision is devoted to recounting and
reaffirming the notion "that a 'State's purposeful or deliberate denial to
Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration
ofjustice violates the Equal Protection Clause."'39 Many of the cases cited by
the Court throughout its review of this equal-protection jury-selection
jurisprudence involved challenges to discriminatory grandjury selection.

grand juror cannot make a difference. Richard Kluger, in his seminal book, recounts the story
of Justice Marshall's father, Will Marshall, a Baltimore waiter who became the first African
American grand juror to serve in the city. See KLUGER, supra note i, at 175-76. Suspicious of the
motives of his fellow grand jurors, who would inquire as to the race of the target of the grand

jury investigation in each case, the senior Marshall prevailed upon the grand jury foreman to
disallow such inquiries in future cases. See id. at 176.
37. See infra Part II.

38.

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 n.3 (1986) (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405

39.

Id. at 84 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.

U.S.

625,

626 n.3

(1972)).

202,

203-04 (1965)); see also id. at 84-

89. The petitioner in Batson, constrained by the belief Swain v. Alabama foreclosed an equal
protection argument within the facts of the case, rested his claim primarily on a fair cross-

section argument under the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 83-84; Brief for Petitioner, Batson, 476
U.S. 79 (No. 84-6263), 1985 WL 66782 at *4-5. However, amicus briefs were free to raise
squarely the equal protection issue-and the invitation to overturn Swain. See Brief for the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae, Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (No. 846263), 1985 WL 66992o, at *11-17; Brief Amici Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc., the American Jewish Committee, and the American Jewish Congress,
Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (No. 84-6263), 198 4 WL 565907 at *24-36.
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The Fourteenth Amendment's promise of equal protection of the laws
failed to put an end to the exclusion of blacks on grand and petit juries in
many parts of the country in the late-nineteenth century.40 Congress sought
to enforce the provisions of the amendment with the Civil Rights Act of
1875.4' Footnote three of the Batson decision cited 18 U.S.C. § 243 for the
proposition that "[t]he basic principles prohibiting exclusion of persons
from participation in [grand and petit] jury service.., are reinforced by the
criminal laws of the United States."42 Section 243 derives from the Civil
Rights Act of 1875,43 the sweeping Reconstruction-era civil-rights legislation,
significant portions of which were struck down by the Court in 1883.44
Section 4 of the civil-rights legislation, which had survived constitutional
challenges in earlier cases,45 pertained to grand jury and petit jury service:
Sec. 4. That no citizen possessing all other qualifications which are
or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as
grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any
State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude;
and any officer or other person charged with any duty in the
selection or summoning of jurors who shall exclude or fail to
summon any citizen for the cause aforesaid shall, on conviction
thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be fined not
more than five thousand dollars.46
Notably, this statute covered both grand jury and petit jury discrimination.
Furthermore, it gave standing to the black person (potential juror)
discriminated against, rather than to the defendant being indicted or
convicted.
Four years after its passage, the constitutionality of Section 4 of the
1875 Act was challenged in Ex parte Virginia.47 The Supreme Court held that
Section 4 was authorized under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth

40.
See CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, JURY DIscRIMINATION: THE SUPREME COURT, PUBLIC
OPINION, AND A GRASSROOTS FIGHT FOR RACIAL EQUALITY IN MISSISSIPPI 153-200 (201 o); see also

KLUGER, supra note 1, at 61-63.
41.
SeeNeal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386 (1881).
42.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 n. 3 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

43. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335. Interestingly, under the legislation, a
prosecutor who "willfully fail[ed] to institute and prosecute" violations of the 1875 Act was
subject to a $500 forfeiture or a misdemeanor conviction punishable by a fine of between
$iooo and $5000. See id. § 3.

44.

See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (striking down Sections i and 2 of the

legislation pertaining to public accommodations); WILLIAM T. COLEMAN WITH DONALD T. BISS,
COUNSEL FOR THE SITUATION: SHAPING THE LAW TO REALIZE AMERICA'S PROMISE 113 (2010);

John Hope Franklin, The Enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 6 PROLOGUE 225, 234-35

(1974).
45.
46.
47.

See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
§ 4, 18 Stat. at 336-37.
Exparte Virginia, 1oo U.S. 339 (1879).
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Amendments and that a state judge who discriminated against blacks in
selecting grand jurors could be held to answer for a violation of the 1875
Act because jury selection was a ministerial action, not an immunityprotected judicial act.48 In dissent, Justice Field cited federalism concerns
with the federal regulation of state juror-selection practices and argued that
eligibility for jury service is not an incident of citizenship, pointing out that
women, minors, and the elderly are all citizens yet regularly were barred
from jury service.49 Justice Field also employed a number of slippery-slope
arguments, positing that a requirement of jury diversity ultimately would
lead to a requirement of bench diversity and suggesting that if equal
protection required a diverse jury for a fair trial, then perhaps it also would
demand an all-black jury in cases involving black defendants.5o
As the 1875 Civil Rights Act was being implemented and challenged in
the lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court began deciding a line of cases
defining the parameters of the Fourteenth Amendment's regulation of state
jury-selection practices. These cases would establish the bedrock equal
protection principles upon which Batson and its progeny rest. Most of these
cases involved challenges to grand-jury-selection practices. Perhaps the most
significant of these cases was one of the earliest-Strauder v. West Virginia.5'
In Strauder, the Supreme Court "decided that the State denies a black
defendant equal protection of the laws when it puts him on trial before a
jury from which members of his race have been purposefully excluded."52
West Virginia, by statute, limited jury service to white males.53 The Court
reversed the conviction of a black defendant in West Virginia who
challenged the all-white grand jury that indicted him and the petit jury that
convicted him on the grounds that the state's exclusion of blacks from jury
eligibility violated the Fourteenth Amendment.54 The Court was careful to
emphasize, however, that the question it answered was not whether a
colored man, when an indictment has been preferred against him, has a
right to a grand or a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of
his own race or color, but.., whether, in the composition or selection of
jurors by whom he is to be indicted or tried, all persons of his race or color
may be excluded by law, solely because of their race or color, so that by no
possibility can any colored man sit upon the jury.5M The Supreme Court
would revisit this distinction between jury diversity on the one hand and

48.

Id. at 348-49.

49.

Id. at 367 (Field,J., dissenting).

50.

Id. at 368-69 (Field, J., dissenting).
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1 88o).

51.

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
53. Strauder, oo U.S. at 305.
54. Id. at 312. The Court also reaffirmed the federal removal statute, § 641, which
permitted removal of state criminal cases to federal court. See id. at 311-12.
55. Id. at 305.
52.
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anti-discrimination on the other hand time and time again, including in
Batson itself.56 For example, in Virginia v. Rives, a case challenging
discrimination in the selection of the grand jury and the petit jury, one of
the defendant's arguments was that the petit jury should have included
blacks, given the racial makeup of the county.57 The Court emphasized that
a diverse jury is not essential to the equal protection of the laws; all that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to the defendant is "that, in the
selection ofjurors to pass upon his life, liberty, or property, there shall be no
exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against them because of their
color."ss A year later, in Neal v. Delaware,the Court reversed a conviction of a
black defendant by an all-white petit jury on an indictment returned by an
all-white grand jury, where it was established that black grand jurors had
been excluded on the premise that blacks were not fit to serve on juries.59
The Court reaffirmed its stance in Strauder,stating:
that to compel a colored man to submit to a trial before a jury
drawn from a panel from which was excluded, because of their
color, every man of his race, however well qualified by education
and character to discharge the functions of jurors, was a denial of
the equal protection of the laws .... 6o
However, the Court was careful to underscore its position in Virginia v. Rives
that the Constitution does not guarantee jury diversity, only the
nonexclusion of blacks. 6'
Strauder, Rives, and Neal were part of a line of cases decided under the
federal civil-rights removal statute, which was established by the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.62 Section 641 of the Revised Statutes permitted a state criminal
defendant to remove a criminal prosecution to federal court if the state's
56.

Batson,476 U.S. at 85-86 & nn.5-6.

57.

Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1879).

58.

Id. at 323; see also KLUGER, supra note i, at 62-63.

59. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 396-98 (188o). As the chief justice of the Delaware
court stated in the case below in connection with the state's concession that blacks had never
been permitted to serve on juries: "that none but white men were selected is in nowise
remarkable in view of the fact-too notorious to be ignored-that the great body of black men
residing in this State are utterly unqualified by want of intelligence, experience, or moral
integrity to sit onjuries." Id. at 393-94 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6o. Id. at 386.
61. Id. at 394 ("We repeat what was said in [ Virginia v. Rives], that while a colored citizen,
party to a trial involving his life, liberty, or property, cannot claim, as matter of right, that his
race shall have a representation on the jury, and while a mixed jury, in a particular case, is not
within the meaning of the Constitution, always or absolutely necessary to the equal protection
of the laws, it is a right to which he is entitled, 'that in the selection of jurors to pass upon his
life, liberty, or property, there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against
them, because of their color.'"). Justice Field dissented, arguing, inter alia, that the absence of
black jurors did not necessarily mean that blacks were excluded because of race. See id. at 401
(Field,J., dissenting).
62. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 786 (1966).
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initiation of the prosecution violated his federal constitutional or statutory
civil rights. 63 However, the Court interpreted the statute to have three

significant limitations. First, the constitutional deprivations triggering
removal were not coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment. 64
Therefore, not all constitutional deprivations would trigger removal under
§ 641.65 Second, the Court developed the view that only deprivations
pursuant to valid, facially discriminatory state statutes or constitutional
provisions were bases for removal under § 641 .66 For instance, if a state
officer-such as a judge or jury commissioner--excluded blacks from a
grand jury even though the state jury-qualification law was not facially
discriminatory, the resulting constitutional deprivation would not be
grounds for removal. However, if the state officer dutifully followed a facially
discriminatory law and excluded blacks from the grand jury because of it,
then § 641 would permit removal because the officer had acted pursuant to
legal authority.6 7 Finally, and perhaps most importantly for present
purposes, the statute provided relief for pretrialdeprivations; in other words,

63.
18 R.S. § 641 (1874). In 1911, the provision was substantially carried forward in the
Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 31, 36 Stat. 1O87, 1o96, and, in 1926, at 28 U.S.C. § 74
(1926). Since 1948, the removal provision has been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1443 and now
reads:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State
court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: (1) Against
any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right
under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or
of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof; (2) For any act under color of
authority derived from any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any
act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law.
28 U.S.C. § 1443 (2oo6); see also Rachel, 384 U.S. at 788-9o; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal
ProsecutionsAffecting Federally GuaranteedCivil Rights: FederalRemoval and HabeasCorpusJurisdiction
To Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1965).
64. See Neal, 103 U.S. at 386 ("[T]he constitutional amendment [is] broader than the
provisions of sect. 641 of the Revised Statutes... ").
65. See id. at 386-87.
66. See, e.g., Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S.
110, 122 (1883).
67. In Neal, the Court bent over backwards to deny application of § 641 where Delaware's
Constitution contained a facially discriminatory provision restricting the franchise-the basis
for juror eligibility in the state-to white men. The Court reasoned that the Fifteenth
Amendment to the Constitution had rendered the state constitutional provision a nullity and,
therefore, a state officer who excluded blacks from grand jury service actually was violating state
law (properly understood) and did not commit a constitutional deprivation sufficient to trigger
removal under § 641. Neal, 103 U.S. at 388-93. One might easily suspect that this logic was a
pretext for the pragmatic concern that a number of states in the South had yet to amend their
constitutions to comply with the provisions of the Civil War Amendments and enforcing federal
legislation. As a result, nearly every constitutional or civil-rights deprivation in criminal or civil
cases would give rise to removal under § 641. See id. at 392; WALDREP, supra note 40, at 185.
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it did not permit federal removal of state criminal cases for constitutional
68
violations that took place during trial.
As the Court explained in Neal, § 641 "only authorized a removal before
trial, it did not embrace a case in which a right is denied by judicial action
during the trial, or in the sentence, or in the mode of executing the
sentence." 69 Constitutional deprivations taking place after trial had
commenced were only remediable through direct appeal and habeas review
0
in the state and federal courts.7
Taken together, these limitations-particularly the pretrial-deprivation
limitation-meant that challenging discrimination in the selection of the
grand jury may have been the only realistic hope for black defendants
seeking expedient preconviction relief from biased state criminal
proceedings.7' As a result, many of these criminal removal proceedingsand subsequent equal-protection cases in the Supreme Court-were grand
2
jury selection cases.7
In Carter v. Texas, the Court relied on Strauder, Neal, and Gibson in
reaffirming that the exclusion of all blacks from serving as grand jurors in a
prosecution of anotherblack denies him equal protection of the laws:
Whenever, by any action of a state, whether through its legislature,
through its courts, or through its executive or administrative
officers, all persons of the African race are excluded, solely because
of their race or color, from serving as grand jurors in the criminal

SeeGibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1896).
Nea4 103 U.S. at 386.
See id. at 386-87.
70.
71. When black defendants challenged jury discrimination at this pretrial stage they
typically knew blacks had been excluded from the grand jury but merely anticipatedblacks would
be excluded from the petitjury panel.
72. Another example of a grand jury selection case based on an application for removal
under §641 can be found in Gibson. The Gibson Court reemphasized the limitation of the
coverage of the removal statute to state discrimination authorized by law. See Gibson, 162 U.S. at
581, 585. In Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592, 6oo (1896), a case argued the same day as
Gibson, the Court rejected another grand jury discrimination challenge on similar grounds to
those articulated in Gibson. Interestingly, counsel for petitioner Smith, Cornelius J. Jones, and
counsel for petitioner Gibson, Wilfred H. Smith and Emmanuel Moylneaux Hewlett, were all
African American-"the first time in American legal history that more than one black lawyer
had been heard before the United States Supreme Court on different cases on the same day."
SMITH, supra note 9, at 294. Indeed, the Court, in Gibson, noted that the argument on behalf of
the black defendant had been "forcibly presented by his counsel, who are of his race." Gibson,
162 U.S. at 592. Two years later, AttorneyJones would argue and lose the Supreme Court grand
jury selection discrimination case of Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898). Attorneys
Smith and Hewlett would later team together and successfully argue for the petitioner in Carter
v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (19oo), another grand jury selection case. See R. VOLNEY RISER, DEFYING
68.
69.

DISFRANCHISEMENT: BLACK VOTING RIGHTS AcTIvISM IN THE JIM CROW SOUTH, 189o-19o8, at

101

(2010).
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prosecution of a person of the African race, the equal protection of
the laws is denied .... 73
The Court would "consistently and repeatedly reaffirm[]" Carter's turn-ofthe-century restatement of the equal protection lessons of the late
nineteenth-century grand jury discrimination cases in grand jury and petit
jury selection cases right up through Batson itself.74
III.

GRANDJURY SELECTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BATSON
FRAMEWORK

In Part Three of the Batson decision, the Court articulated the
framework for "proving purposeful discrimination on the part of the State"
in the context of peremptory challenges.75 In doing so, the Court relied
heavily upon a handful of cases that established the basic parameters of the
evidentiary framework it applied to peremptory challenges in Batson.76
Again, many of these keystone cases-like the aforementioned equal
protection cases-were cases challenging discriminatory grand jury
selection.
The late nineteenth-century grand jury cases did more than establish
the equal protection principles upon which Batson rests. They also began to
sketch the outlines of the Court's determination of how advocates would
have to prove jury selection discrimination. One aspect of this proof
question involved the burden of proving purposeful discrimination and the
resulting importance of access to sworn testimony from those in control of
juror selection. For example, in Carter, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals-the court of last resort in Texas for criminal appealsacknowledged that it is virtually impossible for a criminal defendant to
challenge the makeup of a grand jury array prior to indictment.77 The
Supreme Court jumped at the opportunity to clarify that courts must give
criminal defendants a fair opportunity to challenge the grand jury array.78
The Court made clear that defendants challenging grand jury composition
must be permitted "to introduce witnesses to prove discrimination in the
selection of jurors."79 Neal also addressed this question, with the Court
chastising the state court for not allowing the defendant leave to gather
evidence of his grand jury discrimination claim by calling jury

73. Carter, 177 U.S. at 447. Unlike many of the other cases discussed, Carter involved a
black victim. SeeWALOREP, supranote 40, at 197.
74. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also id. at 85-89 (collecting cases).
°
75. Id. at9 o.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 9o-98.
See Carter, 177 U.S. at 446.
See also id. at 447; WALDREP, supra note 40, at 200.
WALDREP, supra note 40, at 2oo; see also Carter,177 U.S. 442.
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commissioners8o These cases foreshadowed the type of strategy showcased
by Charles Hamilton Houston in the Crawford case. Houston's tactics-in
surveying the local community, scouring jury, voter, and tax rolls, and
comparing qualifications of white and black potential grand jurorsexemplified the sort of advocacy necessary to make such a claim. 8 '
However, another facet of these cases was the Court's reluctant
willingness to entertain "statistical" evidence to help establish a prima facie
case of discrimination in jury selection. The Court's opinion in Neal used
language and analysis that would become more common with time:
The showing thus made, including, as it did, the fact (so generally
known that the court felt obliged to take judicial notice of it) that
no colored citizen had ever been summoned as a juror in the
courts of the State,-although its colored population exceeded
twenty thousand in 187o, and in 188o exceeded twenty-six
thousand, in a total population of less than one hundred and fifty
thousand,-presented a prima facie case of denial, by the officers
charged with the selection of grand and petit jurors, of that
equality of protection which has been secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States.8 2
In Norris v. Alabama, one of the famous Scottsboro cases, the Court again
confronted evidence produced by the defendant that no blacks had ever
been called for grand jury service although there was a critical mass of blacks
qualified to serve.S3 This sort of evidence, according to the Court,
established a prima facie case of systematic discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.8 4 The Court would repeat this approach to the use
of evidence of systematic discrimination in case after case throughout the
1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. 8 5 Of course, the key innovation of Batson dealt with

8o. Neal v. Delaware, 1O3 U.S. 370, 396 (188o); WALDREP, supra note 40, at 185; see also
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 223 (1898) ("There is no charge against the officers to
whom is submitted the selection of grand or petit jurors, or those who procure the lists of the
jurors."); WALDREP, supra note 40, at 194-95 (noting that the Williams Court demanded "direct
evidence that the deputies picking jurors consciously discriminated").
8 1. See supra Part I.A.
82. Neal, 103 U.S. at 397; see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 502 (1977)

(Marshall, J., concurring) ("This line of cases begins with the decision almost a century ago in
Neal v. Delaware ....). Certainly, early shades of this also can be found in the arguments made
by the petitioner in Bush v. Kentucky. See WALDREP, supra note 40, at 188 (quoting Brief for
Plaintiff in Error at 22, Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 1 10 (1883)).
83. Norris v.Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591-92 (1935).
84.

See id.; see also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM,JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND

(1996).
85. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) (grand jury case); Reece v.
Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955) (grand jury case); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)
(grand and petit jury case); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (petit jury case); Cassell v.
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 161-62

Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) (grand jury case); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947)
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how to prove discrimination in an individual case. The Court would move
slowly toward that question, however, winding its way through the 196os and
early 1970s when there were several significant cases considering the use of
statistical evidence in challenges to grand jury and petitjury selection.
The 1965 case of Swain v. Alabama, which was partially overturned in
Batson, serves as the point of departure for this line of cases. In Swain, the
Court rejected a jury-discrimination challenge in a capital rape case.8 6
Despite the underrepresentation of black males on jury panels and the lack
of any black petit jurors in Talladega County for over a decade, the Court
concluded that it was "wholly obvious that Alabama has not totally excluded
a racial group from either grand or petit jury panels,"87 as the Court had
determined in certain other cases.88 Also, recounting the "very old
credentials" of the peremptory challenge,89 the Court rejected the notion
that there should be scrutiny of a prosecutor's reasons for exercising any
particular peremptory challenge in a given criminal case.9o
The Court, however, did entertain the argument that exclusion of
blacks from petit juries through the prosecutor's systematic use of
peremptory challenges violated equal protection.91 Nevertheless, the Court
determined that Swain had not made out a prima facie case because he
presented only evidence of the peremptory challenges exercised in the
instant case; proof of discrimination would require evidence of a pattern of
discriminatory strikes across other cases.. 2 Furthermore, even though the
record was clear that no blacks had served on a petit jury in over a decade,
the Court noted that there was no proof that exclusion of blacks was not the
result of defendants' peremptory strikes against black members of the
venire.93 The dissent accused the majority of undermining Strauderand its
progeny and "creat[ing] additional barriers to the elimination of jury

(grand and petit jury case); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400

(1942)

(grand jury case); Smith v.

Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (grand jury case); Pierre v. Louisiana, 3o6 U.S. 354 (1939) (grand
and petit jury). In the 1935 jury-discrimination case of Hollins v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court

issued a per curiam opinion reaffirming Norris and giving Charles Hamilton Houston a victory
in the United States Supreme Court. See Hollins v. Oklahoma, 296 U.S. 394 (1935)
curiam); KLUGER, supra note i, at 16i.

86.

See Swain v. Alabama, 38o U.S.

202

(per

(1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.

79 (1986); CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, EQUALJUSTICE UNDER LAW 200-01 (1998).

87.
88.
89.

Swain, 380 U.S. at 206.

Id. at 205-o9.

Id. at212.
9o . Id. at 209-22.
91. Id. at 222-24.
92.
Id. at 227 ("[T]he defendant must ... show the prosecutor's systematic use of

peremptory challenges against Negroes over a period of time.").
93.

Id. at 224-26.
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discrimination practices which have operated in many communities to
nullify the command of the Equal Protection Clause."94

Swain launched a sustained run of Supreme Court cases examining how
statistical evidence of jury discrimination should be weighed and considered
in equal protection challenges. Many of these cases-like those in the first
half of the century-would involve challenges to the grand jury.95 In this
post-Swain jurisprudence, the Batson framework continued to take shape. In
Alexander v. Louisiana, the defendant was indicted by an all-white grand jury
in a parish where the eligible grand jury population was twenty-one percent
black.96 The jury commissioners had (ostensibly) randomly refined the list of
eligible grand jurors until only one black remained in the grand jury venire,
and ultimately, no blacks were included on the grand jury that indicted the
defendant.97 Alexander argued:
[T]he substantial disparity between the proportion of blacks
chosen for jury duty and the proportion of blacks in the eligible
population raises a strong inference that racial discrimination and
not chance has produced this result because elementary principles
of probability make it extremely unlikely that a random selection
process would, at each stage, have so consistently reduced the
number of Negroes.98
The Court concluded that Alexander had made out a prima facie case based
on both the racial disparity and the susceptibility of the Lafayette Parish jury
commissioners' selection system to manipulation for discriminatory
purposes:
This Court has never announced mathematical standards for
the demonstration of "systematic" exclusion of blacks but has,
rather, emphasized that a factual inquiry is necessary in each case
that takes into account all possible explanatory factors. The
progressive decimation of potential Negro grand jurors is indeed
striking here, but we do not rest our conclusion that petitioner has
demonstrated a prima facie case of invidious racial discrimination
on statistical improbability alone, for the selection procedures
themselves were not racially neutral. The racial designation on

94. Id. at 231 (Goldberg,J., dissenting). The dissent cited the 1961 Report of the United
States Commission on Civil Rights for the proposition that "[t]he practice of racial exclusion
from juries persists today even though it has long stood indicted as a serious violation of the
14 th amendment." Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

95. See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (challenging grand jury); Jones v.
Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967) (challenging grand and petit jury); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S.
545 (1967) (challenging grand and petitjury).
96. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 627 (1 9 7 2).
97. Id.at 627-28.
98. Id. at 63o.
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both the questionnaire and the information card provided a clear
and easy opportunity for racial discrimination.99
Once the prima facie case of discrimination had been made, the Court
further reasoned that "the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the
presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially
neutral selection criteria and procedures
have produced the
monochromatic result."'1o This burden-shifting framework, which will sound
familiar to students of Batson, was utilized in Alexander and other cases
involving challenges to grand jury selection discrimination.'0'
Less than a decade before Batson, the Court decided Castaneda v.
Partida,a case involving a Mexican American defendant who challenged the
underrepresentation of members of his racial group on the grand jury
produced by the Texas "key-man" grand jury selection system.'0 2 Not only
did this case deal with alleged discrimination against Mexican Americans
rather than blacks and present the issue of underrepresentation rather than
the total exclusion of a racial group, it involved a jurisdiction in which
Mexican Americans were said to have a "governing majority," and where
three of the five jury commissioners were Mexican American. Despite the
contextual differences presented by Castaneda,1°3 the Court seemed to seize
upon the case to complete its refinement and explanation of the burden of
proving discriminatory grand jury selection-a burden that the Court
developed over decades of cases:
[I] n order to show that an equal protection violation has occurred
in the context of grand jury selection, the defendant must show
that the procedure
employed resulted
in substantial

99.

Id.

too.

Id. at 631-32. Alexander, a black man, also challenged Louisiana's exemption of
women from compelled grand jury service, a novel claim the Court did not reach based on the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance and the curious notion that state grand jury indictment is
not required by due process under Hurtadov. California,110 U.S. 516 (1884). See Alexander, 405
U.S. at 633. Justice Douglas's concurrence urged the court to decide the question and to
overturn Strauder's countenance of gender discrimination in grand and petit jury selection. See
id.at 635 (Douglas,J., concurring). Justice Douglas also reiterated the Court's earlier statement
that although a state is not constitutionally bound to require grand jury indictment for felony
offenses, "[o]nce the State chooses to provide grand and petit juries, whether or not
constitutionally required to do so, it must hew to federal constitutional criteria." Id. at 635-36
(quoting Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970)). That same year, the Court decided
Peters v. Kff which held that a white defendant could challenge a grand jury from which blacks
were excluded. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
lol. See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (grand jury case); Eubanks v.
Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) (grand jury case); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)
(grand and petit jury case).
102.
103.

SeeCastaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 485-92 (1977).

These issues resulted in a spirited exchange between Justice Marshall, who concurred,
id. at 501-03 (Marshall, J.,concurring), and Justice Powell, who wrote a separate dissent, id. at
507-18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to
which he belongs. The first step is to establish that the group is one
that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different
treatment under the laws, as written or as applied. Next, the degree
of underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the
proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion
called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time....
Finally, as noted above, a selection procedure that is susceptible of
abuse or is not racially neutral supports the presumption of
discrimination raised by the statistical showing. Once the
defendant has shown substantial underrepresentation of his group,
he has made out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and
the burden then shifts to the State to rebut [the] case.' 0 4
A review of Part III.C of the Batson decision demonstrates clearly that the
evidentiary standards it set out for challenging a prosecutor's race-based
peremptory strike of a petit juror were evolved from the Court's
jurisprudence developed in the grand jury selection discrimination cases
over the previous half century.'°5 Thus, as with its equal protection
°6
foundation, Batson clearly reflects its grand jury DNA.'
CONCLUSION

As this Essay argues, the jurisprudence that arose from a century of
challenges to discriminatory grand jury selection practices laid the
foundation for the Batson decision. Although the Batson decision
represented a tremendous victory for the principles muted in Swain,,07 some
have questioned whether it does enough to eliminate racial discrimination
in peremptory challenges. ,os Indeed, in his Batson concurrence, Justice
Thurgood Marshall argued that the only way to "end the racial
discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process"°09 is
"by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely."-o The extent to which
Batson has lived up to its promise is explored in the many contributions to
this symposium issue.

Id. at 494-95 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted).
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986).
io6. Other significant grand jury selection cases in the years leading up to Batson include
Rose v. Mitchel, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (grand jury foreperson selection); Hobby v. United States,
468 U.S. 339 (1984) (grand jury foreperson selection); and Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254
(1986) (grand jury selection).
107. See GREENBERG, supranote 8, at 460; MOTLEY, supra note 86, at 200-01.
1 o8.
See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Blind Jfustice? Race, the Constitution, and the Justice System, in
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 235, 237-38 (John Hope Franklin &
Genna Rae McNeil eds., 1995).
lo9. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall,J., concurring).
104.
105.

i io.

Id. at 103 .
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However, in our "world of guilty pleas,"'
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it may be advisable to focus

more attention on the grand jury. As jury trials become increasingly obscure,
the grand jury touches many more criminal cases than does the petit jury. As
the author has argued elsewhere,,' ' the grand jury is an organ with
tremendous potential to contribute to and improve the administration of
modern criminal justice. Perhaps a first step to greater appreciation of the
grand jury is to acknowledge the heritage it shares with the more celebrated
petit jury in the lengthy struggle to eradicate discrimination in the selection
of jurors. In this way, the jurisprudence developed in the context of grand
jury discrimination cases stretching back to the Reconstruction era can serve
as the catalyst for a contemporary conversation about participation and
equality in the administration of criminal justice.

1 11.
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Findingand Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 1o YALE L.J. 1097, 1150 (2001) ("Our world is no longer one of trials, but of

guilty pleas."); Ronald F. Wright, TrialDistortion and the End of Innocence in FederalCriminalJustice,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 90 (2005) (citing data showing that over 95% of federal defendants
plead guilty).
112. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., GrandJury Innovation: Toward a FunctionalMakeover of the
Ancient Bulwark of Liberty, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 339 (2010).

